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PIPER v. JENKINS
length of the period of adverse use or possession. Then
there is the other view followed here and in the Florida
case. 8 This rule may be stated thus: The marketability
of a title is not interfered with unless there is a substan-
tial encroachment that interferes with the public use of
the way, or unless the city policy can be established as
requiring the removal of all such encroachments. The New
York and Maryland Courts differ not in the law, but in its
application because of the widely different municipal poli-
cies involved as to encroachments on city streets.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF REPLICATION
TO PLEA OF LIMITATIONS
Piper v. Jenkins'
This is an action of deceit arising out of the purchase of
a house and lot by plaintiffs. The declaration, filed on
February 18, 1954, alleges that on October 22, 1947, the
plaintiffs entered into a contract for the purchase of the
land, which was conveyed to them by deed dated November
19, 1947; that prior to the contract the plaintiffs had in-
spected the land in company of one of the defendants, who
had pointed out to them a garden, surrounded by rocks,
lying about twenty-five feet east of the house; that the de-
fendant had specifically represented that the east boundary
of the lot ran approximately one foot east of the east
boundary of this garden, but that in February, 1952, the
plaintiffs discovered that both the north and south lines of
their house projected beyond the true east boundary of the
lot. Plaintiffs alleged that the representation was material
and had been made falsely, or with a reckless disregard for
its truth or falsity, and claimed damages. In addition to
the general issue, defendants filed a plea of limitations.
Plaintiffs filed a replication thereto claiming the defen-
dants' fraud had kept them in ignorance of their cause of
action. A demurrer to this replication was sustained by
the lower court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.'
In the course of the opinion, before reaching the problem
of the legal sufficiency of the replication, the Court of
Appeals made several interesting rulings. They pointed out
that a vendor of land can be held liable for a misrepresenta-
tion of the boundary made with knowledge of its falsity or
8Supra, n. 11, as well as the jurisdictions cited in Baldwin v. Trimble,
supra, n. 7.
1113 A. 2d 919 (Md., 1955).
However, the case was remanded with leave to amend.
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with a reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.3 This is a
specific application of the general Maryland rule4 to this
area.
Another ruling' is that where the vendor undertakes to
point out unmarked boundaries, he must do it correctly, so
that the purchaser is entitled to rely thereon, and is not
obligated to search the land records or have a survey
made.' While there are no prior Maryland cases on this
point, there are many American cases holding that the pur-
chaser of land may justifiably rely solely on a representa-
tion made by the seller as to the location or acreage of
the property sold, and need not make an independent
investigation. 7
However, the appeal is from the judgment entered for
the defendants sustaining the demurrer to the replication,
which had pleaded:
"That the said cause of action did accrue within
three years prior to the filing of this suit inasmuch as
the defendants in this cause did fraudulently represent
the boundaries of the property which is the subject of
this suit and kept the plaintiffs in ignorance of the said
cause of action by failing in the initial representation
and by failing at any subsequent time to reveal to the
plaintiffs the true locations of the boundary lines; and
the said facts did not come to the knowledge of the
plaintiffs until on or about the month of February 1952,
although they used ordinary and usual diligence to dis-
cover the same.""
Plaintiffs were trying to come within Art. 57, Sec. 14 of
the Code, which provides:
"In all actions where a party has a cause of action of
which he has been kept in ignorance by the fraud of
the adverse party, the right to bring suit shall be
'Supra, n. 1, 921.
'Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 56 A. 794 (1904) ; Boulden v. Stilwell,
100 Md. 543, 60 A. 609 (1905).
5 Supra, n. 1, 922.
Ibid.
IMcGi'bbons v. Wilder, 78 Iowa 531, 43 N. W. 520 (1889) ; Castenholz v.
Heller, 82 Wisc. 30, 51 N. W. 432 (1892) ; Roberts v. Holliday, 10 S. D. 576,
74 N. W. 1034 (1898) ; Rohrof v. Schulte, 154 Ind. 183, 55 N. E. 427 (1899) ;
Judd v. Walker, 114 Mo. App. 128, 89 .S. W. 558 (1905), aff'd. 215 Mo. 312,
114 S. W. 979 (1908) ; Stearns v. Kennedy, 94 Minn. 439, 103 N. W. 212
(1905) ; Stout v. Martin, 87 W. Va. 1, 104 S. E. 157 (1920); Wheeler v.
Purseley, 88 Okla. 27, 210 P. 1019 (1922) ; Pattrldge v. Youmans, 107 Col.
122, 109 P. 2d 646 (1941) ; Younis v. Hart, 59 Cal. App. 2d 99, 138 P. 2d
323 (1943) ; Lanning v. Sprague, 71 Ida. 138, 227 P. 2d 347 (1951) ; Clark
v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 109 A. 2d 538 (1954).8 No. 154, Oct. Term, 1954, Appellants' Brief, App. p. 4.
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deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such
fraud shall or with usual or ordinary diligence might
have been known or discovered."9
The appeal was unsuccessful for two reasons: (1) The
replication failed to allege specifically how defendants kept
plaintiffs in ignorance of their right of action; and, (2)
the replication failed to state specifically: (a) how plaintiffs
discovered the fraud; (b) why the discovery was not made
sooner; and (c) what diligence plaintiffs exercised to dis-
cover the fraud.
Actually the Court did not rest its conclusion too heavily
on the first point in view of the determination that such a
misrepresentation can be a fraud, that the plaintiffs would
be entitled to rely on it, and that the Maryland statute does
not require a separate fraud in concealing the right of action
where the original fraud is concealed or is of such a nature
as to conceal itself.10
The second point, which is the crux of the opinion, is
perfectly consistent with the conditions expressed in the
Statute and with previous enunciations of the Court as to
the requirements of the statute. For example, in State v.
Henderson," the Court, in dealing with the propriety of
rejecting a prayer under this section, said:
"There was no error in the Court in rejecting the
prayer, for it excluded from the consideration of the
jury one most material element necessary to the pro-
tection which the Statute intended to secure, namely,
that by ordinary diligence the fraud could not have
been discovered sooner.' 12
However, the particularity required under the principal
case has not always been observed, or indeed demanded.
In Wear v. Skinner,"3 a case dealing with an alleged fraudu-
lently induced assignment of a partnership interest, no
question was made as to the sufficiency of pleading detail
in the following replication:
"'That he was kept in ignorance by the fraud of the
defendant for a long time of the cause of action, which
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 57, Sec. 14; Md. Laws 1868, Ch. 357. The present
form is for all practical purposes identical with the statute as originally
enacted.
10 Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md. 257 (1877) ; New England Ins. Co. v. Swain,
100 Md. 558, 60 A. 469 (1905); Berman v. Leckner, 188 Md. 321, 52 A.
464 (1947).
n 54 Md. 332 (1880).
"I1bid, 341. See also, Insurance Co. of North America v. Parr, 44 F. 2d
573 (4th Cir., 1930).
"Supra, n. 10.
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he had against the defendant, and that he brought his
action within three years from the time at which he
could, with usual and ordinary diligence, have dis-
covered the fraud'.'
14
In Cummings v. Bannon a replication substantially simi-
lar to the one above, and probably patterned after it, is said
by the Court to be "drawn in strict conformity with the act
of 1868".1'
Cumberland Glass Mnf'g. Co. v. DeWitt,' a leading
Maryland case, involved a tortious interference with a con-
tractual relation. The contract was made in February, 1906,
breached almost immediately, and suit was filed in 1910.
Plaintiff's amended replication stated that the defendant
fraudulently concealed the interference "although the
plaintiff did charge the defendant with the same upon the
first of March, in the year 1906; and the said facts did not
come to the knowledge of the said plaintiff until the latter
part of the year 1909, although he had used ordinary dili-
gence to discover the same".' 7 The Court said, "We also
hold that the amended replication to the plea of limitations
was good.... The language of the replication sets out facts
which avoid the plea."'"
However, by 1945, the requirement which is spelled out
in the principal case began to appear. In dealing with a
suit filed well over twenty years after the cause of action
accrued, the Court gave additional support to its finding of
limitations and res judicata, in this language:
"Nor is this case within Section 14 of Article 57.
No facts alleged show either (i) that the plaintiff 'has
been kept in ignorance of his cause of action by fraud'
of the defendant or (ii) that 'such fraud with usual or
ordinary diligence might not have been known or dis-
covered' within three years before this suit."'
Of course the purpose of this rule is to allow the trial
court to make a determination early in the case as to
whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to dis-
cover the fraud. The requirement seems to be a perfectly
fair way of separating those who have slept on their rights
from the real victims of fraud, with a minimum of expense
and delay.
4 bid, 264.
8 A. 357, 359 (Md., 1887).
120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927 (1913), aff'd. 237 U. S. 447 (1915).
"Ibid, 387.
18 Ibid, 389.
Giessman v. Garrett County, 185 Md. 350, 362, 44 A. 2d 862 (1945).
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